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Germ Shed Management in the United States 
 
Kevin Outterson 
BU Law 
 
Olga Yevtukhova 
BU School of Public Health 
 
Germ Shed Management in the United States, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES:  CONTROLLING 
HOSPITAL-ASSOCIATED INFECTION (Ian M. Gould and Jos van der Meer, eds., Springer, 2011) 
(http://ssrn.com/author=340746). 
 
 
Abstract:  The U.S. Medicare program reimburses only for discrete treatments of 
individuals with infections, but fails to pay for infection control or antibiotic 
stewardship more generally.  By focusing solely on discrete hospitals and 
patients, Medicare ignores the larger epidemiological reality – that hospitals, 
nursing homes and other institutions operate within a germ shed.  Under current 
Medicare rules, institutions that invest in infection control or antibiotic 
stewardship may actually lose money and benefit rival firms in the market.  In 
effect, current Medicare rules subsidize MRSA pollution.  Worse yet, Medicare 
rules block potentially efficient Coasian contracts to promote private coordination 
within germ sheds. 
 
I.  Germ Sheds 
 
In the US, Medicare reimburses hospitals as if antibiotic resistance were 
localized only in the hospital itself.  Medicare focuses on hospitals as discrete 
institutions, as if methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) or other 
germs respected corporate boundaries on an organizational chart or legal 
boundaries on a map.  US hospitals are paid by the case, but microbes operate 
in a larger epidemiological environment, a germ shed.  
 
A germ shed is roughly analogous to a watershed:  clinical regions that are 
epidemiologically interdependent and thus share positive and negative infectious 
disease externalities.  For most hospitals, the germ shed will be larger than just 
the institution, but will also include long-term care facilities that transfer patients 
to and from the hospital.  Other institutions in the germ shed could include 
                                                 
 Corresponding author:  mko@bu.edu.  I wish to thank Marc Lipsitch of the Harvard 
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patent coordination mechanisms for antibiotic conservation.  This work is supported by 
research grants from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the David Saul Smith 
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1838444
         Page 2 of 22 
ambulatory surgical centers, rehabilitation facilities, dialysis centers, prisons, 
schools and the community at large.  The existence and scope of a germ shed is 
empirically established, using epidemiological data. Tools to promote the long-
term effectiveness of antibiotics include infection control, vaccination, and 
antibiotic stewardship and other antibiotic conservation measures (Laxminarayan 
and Malani, 2007).  Our primary insight is that some of these tools should be 
applied across the germ shed, not just in discrete institutions.  This article will 
focus on MRSA as an example, but the principles may apply to other resistant 
pathogens. 
 
This chapter explores the problems that US Medicare creates when it fails to 
modify reimbursement to account for germ sheds.  One approach might 
reimburse regional groups of hospitals for infection control and pay bonuses for 
reducing infections within the germ shed.  Medicare’s new value-based 
purchasing (VBP) initiative is trying to realign some quality incentives, but still 
focuses just on individual hospitals instead of the larger epidemiological 
environment.  While the Dutch have successfully responded to MRSA on a 
national basis, the fragmented nature of the US health care market (Elhauge, 
2010) makes this type of coordination more difficult.  
 
II. Germ Shed Issues Within US Hospitals  
 
A.  MRSA pollution from US hospitals 
 
MRSA pollution occurs when a health care institution does not prevent 
transmission.  MRSA is a significant public health issue in the US (Wenzel, 
2007).  A recent study by Klevens, et al. found 94,360 invasive MRSA infections 
in the US in 2005, associated with 18,650 deaths (Klevens et al, 2007).  Another 
study, published nearly simultaneously, found the MRSA infection rate to be 
higher (278,203) but the death rate lower (6,000) (Klein et al, 2007).  While the 
data remains incomplete (GAO, 2008), the medical community views MRSA as a 
large and growing public health problem:  “Our findings suggest that S. aureus 
and MRSA should be considered a national priority for disease control” (Klein et 
al, 2007).    
 
As MRSA emerged in the late 1970s, hospitals and other institutional providers 
turned to vancomycin as an effective treatment. Absent vancomycin, hospitals 
would have resorted to less effective treatments and implemented additional 
infection control measures.  More patient deaths would undoubtedly have 
occurred, but a major MRSA crisis in the 1980s might have given the market 
enough signals to induce more antibiotic R&D in the following decades.  The 
success of vancomycin dampened the need for other antibiotics in the 1980s and 
1990s, much as methicillin dominated in the 1960s and 1970s.  Vancomycin’s 
success in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to the antibiotic incentive problem 
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that many identify today (Talbot et al, 2006; Norrby, et al, 2005; Wenzel, 2004; 
Outterson, 2010).1   
 
Vancomycin’s effectiveness in the last few decades permitted higher levels of 
MRSA pollution, both within the hospital as well as the larger germ shed.  
Vancomycin temporarily raised the optimal level of MRSA pollution and reduced 
the cost-effectiveness of both conservation and rival product R&D.  
 
B.  Reimbursement under US Medicare  
 
  1. Hospital internal incentives under US Medicare  
 
Hospitals can adopt control measures to reduce the internal and external levels 
of MRSA pollution.  In economics textbooks, most of the cost of pollution falls on 
property owners downwind; a classic externality. MRSA pollution creates 
infectious disease externalities when infected patients are discharged or 
transferred, but a significant portion of the cost also falls on the hospital itself or 
its patients.   
 
Let us therefore initially consider the internal costs.  Ideally, infection control and 
antimicrobial stewardship would be financially rewarding for the hospital.  
Unfortunately, Medicare does not have a billing code for infection control or 
antimicrobial stewardship.  These activities are cost centers for a US hospital, not 
direct sources of revenue.  This is a first-order error if our goal is to promote long-
term effectiveness of antibiotics.  But perhaps the hospital can make a business 
case for antibiotic conservation, investing to reduce costs.  An authoritative 
review of the medical literature concluded that:  
 
“Effective antimicrobial stewardship programs can be financially 
self-supporting and improve patient care.  Comprehensive 
programs have consistently demonstrated a decrease in 
antimicrobial use (22%-36%), with annual savings of $200,000 – 
$900,000 in both larger academic hospitals and smaller community 
hospitals ” (Dellit et al, 2007).   
 
This statement begs a question.  If indeed the internal business case for 
antimicrobial conservation in hospitals is clear, then we should expect rational 
hospital executives to implement such programs.  But the cost savings described 
above are illusory because they are based on “billed” charges (which are almost 
never actually billed) rather than actual Medicare reimbursement.  The US 
reimbursement system is complex, with diverse financial incentives.  The 
following paragraphs will examine the interaction between the Medicare 
                                                 
1 If resistance stimulates innovation, then a corollary may be that a lack of 
resistance dampens innovation, but it dampens exactly the sort of innovation that 
we don’t need. 
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reimbursement system and the direct internal savings in antimicrobial 
stewardship programs.   
 
US hospitals contract with many health plan payors, both private and public.  The 
most important payor is Medicare.  Medicare’s reimbursement system is 
important for two reasons.  First, it is a very large program, constituting the 
largest single revenue source in most US hospitals (GAO, 2008).  Second, some 
private health plans have voluntarily adopted Medicare’s reimbursement 
methodology, which magnifies its importance through a spillover effect (Dove, 
1994; Nichols et al, 2006; Henderson and May, 1983). 
 
Until the early 1980s, Medicare reimbursed hospitals on a cost basis.  Hospitals 
reported their allowable costs to Medicare, and those costs were paid, with an 
implicit mark-up for operating margin.2  Over time, many policy experts 
recognized the inflationary effect of cost-based reimbursement.  Hospitals lacked 
a financial incentive to cut costs.  Rampant cost expansion followed (Scanlon, 
2006).  For example, if a hospital had implemented an antimicrobial stewardship 
program during cost-based reimbursement, the “savings” would be illusory, since 
the reduced costs would also reduce revenues.3  Worse yet, the hospital would 
lose the implicit mark-up on the foregone costs.  This reimbursement system 
actually punished cost-saving measures such as antimicrobial conservation 
during the first decades of the Medicare program.4 
 
For a time, the US Government fought back against higher hospital fees with 
increasingly complex rules for allowable charges.5  These rules frequently 
resulted in protracted litigation over cost-based reimbursement.  Rule articulation 
eventually proved both unwieldy and ineffective (Frankford, 1993).  In fiscal year 
1983, Congress switched most US hospitals from cost-based reimbursement to 
prospective payment.  The program is now called the inpatient prospective 
payment system (IPPS).6  Under this system, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) organized hospital diagnoses and procedures into a list 
of diagnostic-related groups (DRGs), and announced a fixed price in advance for 
each DRG.  The prices are based on a complex formula, which changes from 
year to year, and varies somewhat by geographical region and other factors such 
as wage costs.  
                                                 
2 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(a) (1982). 
3 If the cost-saving program generated spillover savings for patients reimbursed under 
other methodologies, then it is possible that the hospital would have improved its bottom 
line.  To the extent that other payors followed Medicare’s reimbursement model, these 
savings would disappear as well. 
4 This assumes that conservation programs were actually cost effective.  If they raise net 
costs, then all of the incentives discussed in this section are inverted. 
5 See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (the 
“section 223 limits”). 
6 Sec. 1886(d) of the Social Security Act.   
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Economic incentives are quite different under IPPS.  Hospitals now benefit if they 
trim costs, since their payment is no longer tied to actual expenditures.  This new 
reimbursement system has dramatically reshaped the US healthcare sector 
(Scanlon, 2006).  The Medicare reimbursement system now picks winners and 
losers on a macro level, favoring some procedures, services and patients over 
others.  Profit variations occur both within and across DRGs.  Variation within a 
DRG creates opportunities for favorable or unfavorable selection of patients.  
Admitting a sicker than average patient within a particular DRG may cause the 
hospital to lose money; admitting healthier than average patients has the 
opposite effect.   
 
CMS has implemented methods that discourage adverse selection by providers.  
One such technique has been to divide single DRGs into narrower categories, 
which limits a hospital’s ability to avoid high-cost patients.  Another is to 
complicate DRGs by adding features such as co-morbidity modifiers, essentially 
splitting many DRG into multiple subgroups.7  In general, the presence of MRSA 
in a patient can result in higher reimbursement under the DRG.  The economic 
incentives favor treatment rather than prevention.  Put another way, a highly 
successful antibiotic conservation program in a hospital will not generate 
additional Medicare revenue and will probably reduce revenues when less 
intensive co-morbidity modifiers are billed. 
 
Medicare IPPS has other systemic effects on US hospitals.  Variations across 
DRGs make some procedures and services more profitable than others.  For 
example, the site of elective surgeries shifted dramatically since 1984, as the 
Medicare reimbursement system favored ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) 
over hospital inpatient surgeries through a special payment rule.  Many profitable 
surgeries migrated from typical inpatient settings to ASCs and specialty 
hospitals.   
 
Finally, the boundaries between DRGs have encouraged unbundling services 
into different facilities in order to earn a new DRG.  For example, early dismissal 
from a hospital might earn the full DRG, even if the patient was transferred to a 
post acute facility owned by the hospital.  Hospitals responded to these financial 
incentives by discharging patients much more quickly, reducing US average 
length of stay below the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) median (Pearson, 2009).  Hospitals achieved this 
reduction in part by substituting post-acute care for inpatient services (Ashby et 
al, 2000).  The federal government is concerned about these potential distortions 
and is acting to reduce them (MedPac, 2007a), but new initiatives frequently lead 
                                                 
7 Medicare is now transitioning to the MS-DRG system with 258 sets of DRGs, each split 
into two or three subgroups depending upon the presence or absence of a “complication 
or comorbidity” (CC) or major complication or comorbidity” (MCC).  The total number 
of DRGs now exceeds 700.  
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to new unintended consequences (Werner et al, 2008).  Each new adjustment 
adds layers of complexity to the Medicare reimbursement system.  Some critics 
now resort to satire and mock Medicare’s devilish details (Hyman, 2006). 
 
The IPPS is still biased in favor of diagnosis and treatment rather than 
conservation and prevention.  Medicare has not created a reimbursable DRG 
code for hospital infection control efforts, antimicrobial stewardship programs, or 
special isolation procedures for MRSA.  Medicare wants something that it isn’t 
willing to pay for directly.      
 
  2. Hospital germ shed externalities under US Medicare 
 
Hospital infection control efforts generate many positive externalities when 
infections and further resistance are prevented.  Beneficiaries from avoided 
infection include the treated patient, other patients, hospital staff, other providers 
such as long-term care facilities, health insurance payors such as Medicare and 
commercial companies, and the community.   
 
Epidemiologists and public health professionals attempt to maximize these 
positive externalities by reducing the spread of infectious disease.  These 
benefits can accrue over time:  conservation and infection control today may also 
improve the health of future patients, both through reduced transmission and the 
sustained availability of effective antimicrobial agents in future years 
(Laxminarayan and Malani, 2007).   
 
Competitive problems emerge when these positive externalities benefit other 
institutions in the market.  For example, in a two-hospital town, if one hospital 
achieves excellent MRSA control, those efforts should reduce the number of 
MRSA colonized patients admitted to both hospitals.  The first-mover hospital 
incurs costs for infection control and a portion of the resulting benefits accrue to 
its direct competitor in the market.  Likewise, infection control in a long-term care 
facility benefits the hospitals to which its patients are transferred, and vice versa.    
If these institutions are not under common ownership, infection control benefits 
other institutions, perhaps competitors.  Antibiotic stewardship programs also 
generate positive externalities to society, above and beyond the direct savings to 
institutions.  The economic problem is how to pay for these activities that benefit 
others.  Germ shed management is therefore a collective action problem.  
 
Medicare reimbursement currently treats these positive externalities and 
collective action problems with indifference, at best.8  Consider IPPS 
                                                 
8 In ordinary medical care, positive externalities include the continued contributions by 
the patient to society.  IPPS doesn’t reimburse for these social gains, although some 
prescription drug pricing in Australia and Europe takes this approach.  Treatment of 
infectious diseases always generates the additional positive externality of epidemiology.  
While the calculation of the social benefits from health might seem remote and 
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reimbursement and infection control.  Infection control requires meticulous 
attention to detail, including very thorough cleaning, barrier controls, and 
isolation.  These activities are not free.  Under cost-based reimbursement, 
hospitals may have earned a positive margin on infection control.  Under IPPS, 
infection control is part of the cost structure and never generates revenues.  
These are odd signals in our reimbursement system. 
 
At first glance, IPPS favors antibiotic stewardship programs.  Reducing 
prescription costs will improve the hospital’s operating margin.  But this 
equilibrium is disturbed if the DRG is modified for infections.  When patients 
acquire a nosocomial infection, the hospital may qualify for additional 
reimbursement for the complication or co-morbidity.  Hospitals can earn 
additional revenues from nosocomial infections.9  If the infection results in a 
readmission, even more revenue may accrue.  The amounts involved are 
significant.   For the average hospital-acquired infection, hospital costs were an 
additional $8,832 Murphy and Whiting, 2007).  Infection with resistant bacteria 
can double hospital costs (French, 2005).   
 
Hospitals do not deliberately cause infections in order to increase revenue, but 
one unintended effect of the Medicare reimbursement system is to send mixed 
financial signals to hospitals about nosocomial infections.  As Leah Binder of the 
Leapfrog Group testified to Congress, “We must assume that money is 
concentrated at hospitals with the worst record for hospital acquired infections.  
This perverse payment system impedes the implementation of critical quality 
processes.” (Binder, 2008).  Certainly the hospital is not rewarded for creating 
these positive infection and resistance prevention externalities; it is possible that 
they are actually punished financially for helping others. 
 
B.  Legal barriers to private ordering 
 
In an ideal Coasian world, hospitals could contract with the other institutions in 
their germ shed, allocating the positive and negative MRSA externalities through 
private ordering.  Medicare explicitly makes many of these activities felonies 
through the fraud and abuse laws.  In the US, it is illegal for a provider such as a 
hospital to make or receive a referral for many designated health services, if the 
two have a financial relationship.  It would be illegal for a hospital to contract with 
an independent long-term care facility to coordinate infection control and 
antibiotic conservation generally if that contract anticipated any financial flow in 
                                                                                                                                                 
speculative, perhaps infectious disease control can make a stronger case for winning a 
slice of the epidemiological externality as reimbursement. 
9 Whether the additional revenues offset the additional expenses is another matter. It is 
also possible that a MRSA-free hospital would be more profitable, even without 
secondary diagnosis payments (GAO, 2008) (“Hospitals may also incur some of the cost 
because they are not fully reimbursed for the cost of the extra care attributable to 
HAIs.”). 
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either direction.  In other words, Medicare prohibits private ordering to capture 
germ shed externalities. 
 
US competition law also would look askance on contracts between horizontal 
competitors such as the hospitals in a germ shed.  If the contract did not engage 
in naked price fixing or market segmentation it might not be per se illegal, but 
would still suffer potential review and liability for violation of US antitrust laws. 
 
Congress must modify these laws if germ shed management is to occur through 
private contract.  Otherwise, the coordinating mechanism must be Medicare.  
The following section explores that option, in all its complexity. 
 
 
III. Creating markets for hospital quality in US through Medicare   
 
Medicare has not historically modified reimbursement for quality of care:  both 
high quality and low quality care have been paid under the same DRG.  Medicare 
has historically relied on professionalism, accreditation and the tort system to 
support minimum quality standards (GAO, 2008).  Medicare is currently 
experimenting with quality-related modifications to its reimbursement system.10  
Some of these modifications are important for infectious disease.  Supporters 
characterize these changes as pay-for-performance (P4P) or VBP, creating a 
market for quality within Medicare.  After describing the initiatives in some detail, 
we will evaluate their impact on MRSA germ shed externalities. 
  
A.  Paying for reporting of information  
 
Assessing quality in Medicare depends upon timely and accurate data.  In the 
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Congress ostensibly offered a carrot to 
hospitals, offering additional Medicare reimbursement (through the Annual 
Payment Update or APU) in exchange for reporting some hospital quality 
measures.11  In reality, the offer was less carrot and more stick.  The latest 
version reduces the APU by two percentage points for any hospital that does not 
“voluntarily” participate.12  For larger hospitals, this reduction would be millions of 
dollars.  The great majority of US hospitals participate, about 93% of the eligible 
hospitals (GAO, 2008).  
 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal 
Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 47130, at 47200 (Aug. 22, 2007) (final rule); and FY 2009 
Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 23528, 23530 (April 30, 2008).  
11 Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (Dec. 8, 2003).   The law was amended in Pub. L. 109-
171, Section 5001(a) (2005), amending Section 1886(d)(3)(B) of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. section 1395ww(d)(4)).  The first 10 hospital quality measures were proposed 
for reporting as of November 1, 2003.  
12 42 U.S.C. sec. 1395ww(b)(3)(B)(viii)(I). 
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As with all things Medicare, the scope and complexity of reporting will increase 
over time.  Originally, Medicare requested reporting of 10 hospital quality 
indicators.13  Subsequently, Medicare has asked for comments on 26 additional 
“pay for reporting” datasets (MedPAC, 2007a).  The latest proposed rule adds 43 
more for FY 2009.14  Several of these datasets relate to infectious diseases, 
including a surgical infection dataset (MedPAC, 2007a).  This measure may lead 
to payment restrictions based on preventable readmissions (MedPAC, 2007c).  
Some states simply require hospitals to publicly report certain hospital-
associated infection information (Pennsylvania, 2008).  These data collection 
efforts are disjointed, but will form the basis for future policy (GAO, 2008).   
 
Reporting hospital-associated infections is a good first step towards identifying 
and quantifying MRSA pollution, but thus far no public database is tracking 
discharge of patients carrying MRSA or present on admission (POA) statistics 
from particular facilities.  These specialized reports are the sort of information 
needed in order to better quantify germ shed pollution externalities. 
 
B.  Process measures:  mandating best practices 
 
The Medicare pay-for-reporting program includes three measures on infectious 
diseases.  All three track processes rather than outcomes:  (1) providing 
prophylactic antibiotics within one hour of surgery; (2) selecting appropriate 
antibiotics to prevent surgical infections; and (3) stopping prophylactic antibiotics 
within 24 hours after surgery.  These statistics are available to the public on 
Medicare’s website, as part of the program to provide better health care 
information to consumers.  Many of the relevant accreditation standards from the 
Joint Commission are also process standards.    
 
One weakness in the US health sector is measuring and rewarding inputs or 
processes rather than outcomes.  Expensive inputs don’t necessarily yield high 
quality care.  The United States outspends the OECD and deploys the latest 
technology, but with modest comparative results. 
 
Similar questions plague process-based reimbursement.  Procedures may result 
in good outcomes, but sometimes they do not.  A parallel controversy in drug 
development would be evaluating efficacy on intermediate clinical endpoints 
(such as lowering cholesterol) instead of actual clinical outcomes (reduced 
mortality from heart disease).  Each of the three processes selected for the 
Medicare program appears to be reasonable and helpful, but their actual impact 
on patient health and antimicrobial resistance is not yet established.  
 
Focusing on processes rather than outcomes runs the risk of teaching to the test.  
Hospitals may over invest in the listed processes, to the relative neglect of other 
                                                 
13 See FY 2009 Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 23528, at 23643 (April 30, 2008). 
14 FY 2009 Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 23528, at  __ (April 30, 2008). 
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actions that might yield better patient outcomes.  For example, evidence 
suggests that hospitals achieve higher compliance with processes when 
measured (MedPAC, 2003).  Whether this is the best medical care available with 
the given resources is left unanswered at present.  This question will turn on how 
carefully the processes were chosen, and how they are adapted to local 
conditions and constraints.  In essence, some standards of medical care have 
been federalized when Medicare adopts a medical process by administrative 
procedure.  This step represents a major change from the original promise that 
Medicare would not interfere in the practice of medicine.  Nor is it likely to remain 
cabined in a niche of the Medicare program.  The Government Accountability 
Office recently recommended that CMS adopt some of these standards into 
Medicare’s Conditions of Participation (GAO, 2008). 
 
C.  Outcomes measures:  punishing preventable errors 
 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 introduced outcome measures related to 
reasonably preventable errors.15  Congress instructed Medicare to identify 
reasonably preventable errors relating to at least two DRG codes.  Medicare 
responded with enthusiasm, suggesting 13 errors for further study.16  After a 
process involving the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, health care 
industry lobbyists, Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC), and 
others, Medicare identified six hospital-based errors in its FY 2008 Final Rule.17  
These six are sorted into two categories:  “serious preventable events” and 
“reasonably preventable events.”  In the FY 2009 Proposed Rule, Medicare 
collectively refers to these errors as “hospital-acquired conditions” or “HACs.”18  
A better term would be “hospital-associated conditions,” as Medicare should not 
assume causation. 
 
Serious preventable events are also called “never events” – implying that they 
should never happen in a hospital.  CMS identified three in the FY 2008 Final 
Rule:  objects left in the body during surgery; air embolisms; and blood 
incompatibility.19  In Medicare’s view, these three errors are so fundamental that 
they should never occur.  All three are in fact exceedingly rare.  In FY 2006, CMS 
found just 764 Medicare beneficiaries with objects left during surgery, 45 who 
suffered from air embolisms, and only 33 with mismatched blood products.20   
 
                                                 
15 Pub. L. 109-171, Section 5001(c) (2005), amending Section 1886(d)(4) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. section 1395ww(d)(4)).  
16 Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal 
Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 24680 (May 3, 2007) (proposed rule). 
17 Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal 
Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 24680 (May 3, 2007) (proposed rule). 
18 FY 2009 Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 23528, at 23529 (April 30, 2008). 
19 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47201-02.  
20 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47206-07. 
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In the Medicare billing process, HACs may be coded as secondary diagnoses, 
and prior to this new rule, a hospital could receive additional IPPS revenues for 
the additional complication.21  Whether an additional payment is made depends, 
in part, on whether the pairing of the original condition plus the secondary 
diagnosis qualifies for higher reimbursement as a MS-CC DRG.  For example, 
the diagnostic code for leaving a foreign object in the body after surgery is ICD-9-
CM code 998.4.  That code qualifies as a “complication or comorbidity” (CC) that 
modifies the primary DRG for higher payment.  Some serious preventable events 
are not listed as a CC, so Medicare has never paid additional reimbursement for 
those mistakes.  When the code is not a CC, Medicare is already refusing to pay 
for the mistake, and there is no need to further adjust reimbursement. 
 
The second category includes less fundamental errors that Medicare believes 
are “reasonably preventable.”  In the FY 2008 Final Rule, three were selected:  
pressure ulcers (bed sores); hospital-associated infections (catheter-associated 
urinary tract infections); and Staphylococcus aureus bloodstream 
infection/septicemia.  Beginning in October 1, 2008, Medicare will not allow these 
three secondary diagnoses alone to qualify the DRG for a higher reimbursement 
level (MedPAC, 2007a).  The ICD-9-CM codes associated with these “reasonably 
preventable” errors will no longer qualify as a CC. 
 
These changes may not make much financial difference.  The Congressional 
Budget Office scored the statutory authority as having a modest budget impact 
over a decade (CBO, 2006),22 and MedPAC expects “the penalties to be applied 
in relatively few cases.” (MedPAC, 2007a).  One reason is that if multiple CCs 
are present, Medicare only pays the upgrade once.  The FY 2008 Final Rule 
blocks the 6 errors as CCs, but many patients have more than one secondary 
diagnosis.  If at least one of them remains a CC, then reimbursement will remain 
unchanged at the higher level.  
 
MedPAC suggests that Medicare apply a stricter rule to “never events,” denying 
any CC upgrade, despite the presence of other CCs. MedPAC believes that 
Medicare has authority to create this rule administratively, without further 
Congressional action (MedPAC, 2007a).  The President apparently agrees, since 
his FY 2009 Budget proposed this stricter rule without seeking Congressional 
authorization.23  Private payors are also adopting similar rules restricting 
reimbursement for “never events.” (Binder, 2008).  This is another example of the 
spillover effect of Medicare reimbursement rules.   
                                                 
21 Technically, the hospital is being paid for the additional costs associated with treating 
someone after these events, such as re-opening the body to retrieve the lost object.  It is 
possible that the hospital may have lost money on the secondary diagnosis, but P4P 
proponents argue that any payment reinforces poor quality. 
22 Recently, CMS has estimated the budget impact at $50 million per year.  FY 2008 
Proposed Rule, at 23915. 
23 See FY 2009 Proposed Rule, at 23548. 
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Fiscal impact will also be reduced as hospitals improve quality.  More cynically, 
hospitals will also learn to adjust billing and coding practices to minimize 
reporting these errors as solitary secondary diagnoses.  In any event, these 
quality incentives are the leading wedge in a much larger value-based 
purchasing initiative in Medicare.  If the history of Medicare is any guide, these 
rules will significantly expand in scope and complexity over time.  But these 
provisions are unlikely to lead to much litigation, because Congress blocked 
judicial review of the selection and revision of these codes.24  Absent judicial 
review, we rely entirely on Medicare’s administrative process for selecting 
particular processes and outcomes as “best practices” through the 
reimbursement system.  The next section discusses potential weaknesses in 
allowing Medicare to be the final arbiter of evidence-based medicine. 
 
D.  Federalizing the standard of care? 
 
Congress limited the Medicare penalties to “conditions that could reasonably 
have been prevented through the application of evidence-based guidelines.”25  If 
this is a patient-based standard, then Medicare would need to evaluate the facts 
and circumstances of every particular care episode and judge whether the HAC 
was both caused by the hospital and reasonably preventable through the use of 
evidence-based guidelines.  If this were the case, then Medicare would be 
federalizing malpractice law for HACs.  In the US, malpractice law has historically 
been controlled by the states. 
 
But Medicare approaches these evidence-based guidelines from a population-
health perspective.  While each element of the reimbursement process relates to 
a particular patient, the decision on whether the HAC is reimbursable is made at 
an abstract level, using population-based averages.  Several questions are 
raised by this approach.   
 
1.  Evidence-based guidelines 
 
First, Medicare proclaims certain evidence-based guidelines as the standard of 
care, but they probably don’t really mean it.  For example, Medicare relies on 
CDC guidelines and the recommendations of the Healthcare Infection Control 
Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC).  These are proclaimed as the standard 
of care in Medicare’s value-based purchasing initiative: 
 
“CDC produces evidence-based guidelines that serve as the 
standard of care in U.S. hospitals and guide the clinical practices of 
                                                 
24 42 U.S.C. sec. 1395ww(d)(7(B), as amended by Section 5001(c) of the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005. 
25 Pub. L. 109-171, Section 5001(c) (2005), amending  Section 1886(d)(4) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. section 1395ww(d)(4)).  
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physicians, nurses and other providers… Overall, these guidelines 
represent over a thousand evidence-based recommendations 
which, while large in number, address the vast complexity of 
modern medical care.  All of the recommendations are prioritized 
according to the quality of evidence available to support them.” 
(Wright, 2008). 
 
I doubt that Medicare intends to federalize malpractice by proclaiming a national 
standard of care.  Medicare consulted these guidelines when it created the HAC 
list for reimbursement cuts.  The intended meaning may be something closer to 
the following:   
 
“These evidence-based guidelines should be consulted by 
physicians and institutions when making their treatment decisions 
as professionals, in consultation with the patient after informed 
consent.  In some cases, evidence-based standards may disagree, 
or may not reach a clear conclusion.  In others, best medical 
treatment will require departure from evidence-based standards.  
Medical care cannot guarantee positive outcomes, even when the 
standard of care was followed.  Nevertheless, Medicare will deny 
reimbursement for certain HACs, even if evidence-based 
guidelines were followed precisely.”26  
 
Medicare discusses the guidelines because Congress required each identified 
HAC to have “evidence-based guidelines” demonstrating that the HAC was 
“reasonably preventable.”  Nothing in Section 5001 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 requires the actual adoption of the referenced standards into medical 
practice. 
 
2.  Causation 
 
A related question centers on causation.  The FY 2008 Final Rule consistently 
uses the phrase “hospital-acquired.”27  The medical literature generally uses a 
more modest and less determinate phrase, “hospital-associated,” “health care-
associated,” or “community-associated” infections (Dellit et al, 2007).  The 
differences between association and causation are significant, as any statistician 
will attest.     
 
And yet the FY 2008 Final Rule denies reimbursement as if all HACs were 
“caused” by a preventable hospital error.  Medicare denies reimbursement for 
HACs based on what is essentially strict liability.  The medical community has 
raised this issue, but has done so ineffectively to date.  Some commentators on 
                                                 
26 Author’s text.   There is no exception in the MAC process for having followed the 
referenced standard of care. 
27 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47201.  
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the FY 2008 Final Rule “expressed concern that not all hospital-acquired 
infections are preventable and noted that sicker and more complex patients are 
at greater risk for hospital-acquired infections and complications.”28  In the 
preamble to the FY 2008 Final Rule, Medicare appeared to skirt the issue: 
 
“Thus, we are only selecting those conditions where, if hospital 
personnel are engaging in good medical practice, the additional 
costs of the hospital-acquired condition will, in most cases, be 
avoided and the risk of selectively avoiding patients at high risk of 
complications will be minimized.”29 
 
Following the statutory mandate, CMS reviewed many evidence-based 
guidelines and found sufficient evidence for several conditions to be classified as 
“could reasonably have been prevented through the application of evidence-
based guidelines.”30  Two HACs related to infections are: 
 
“Surgical site infections.  The groups and organizations stated that 
there were evidence-based measures to prevent the occurrence of 
these infections…”31 
 
“Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infections… There are widely 
recognized guidelines for the prevention of catheter-associated 
urinary tract infections.  Guidelines can be found at the following 
Web site:  http://www.cdc.ncidod/dhqp/gl--catheter--assoc.html.”32  
 
Others were not chosen in the FY 2008 Final Rule, due to a lack on consensus 
on the causal evidence on preventability: 
 
“Ventilator-associated pneumonias.  The groups and organizations 
indicated that these conditions are currently measured and reported 
through SCIP.  However, other organizations counseled against 
selecting these conditions because they believed it was difficult to 
obtain good definitions and that it was not always clear which ones 
are hospital acquired.”33 
 
                                                 
28 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47200. 
29 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47201.  Note also the concern about adverse selection by 
hospitals and the ease with which CMS dismisses it.   
30 Pub. L. 109-171, Section 5001(c) (2005), amending Section 1886(d)(4) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. section 1395ww(d)(4)).  
31 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47201.  
32 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47203.  
33 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47201. 
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“Pneumonia… Some commentators mentioned that while 
prevention guidelines exist for pneumonia, it is not clear how 
effective these guidelines may be in preventing pneumonia.”34 
 
“Clostridium difficile-associated disease (CDAD)…. While 
prevalence of this condition is emerging as a public health problem, 
there is not currently a strategy for reasonably preventing these 
infections.”35   
 
While the language is imprecise, the essence of Medicare’s approach is as 
follows:  For some diseases, evidence-based guidelines aren’t yet proven to 
make a significant impact on patient outcomes.  For others, the statistical 
evidence is better, and CMS will utilize those guidelines to select specific 
conditions to add to the HAC list.  The act of denying reimbursement in any 
particular case is not an evaluation of whether any deviation from the standard of 
care occurred.  The HAC may not have been reasonably avoidable, even with 
the best medical care.  Nevertheless, Medicare will deny reimbursement.36      
  
Medicare’s approach to causation is revealed in the concept of “present on 
admission” or POA.  Medicare will soon require hospitals to report whether CCs 
and MCCs were present on admission.  This reporting originally did not affect 
reimbursement, but now POA is used to define when a CC or MCC is “hospital-
acquired.”  Medicare will treat all CCs and MCCs as hospital-acquired unless 
they were reported as present on admission.   
 
Several aspects of this rule seem unfair in the infectious disease context.  The 
FY 2008 Final Rule proposed two infectious disease HACs:  surgical site 
infections and catheter-associated urinary tract infections.  Hospitals do not 
routinely screen for infections on admission, but they will either need to screen 
for urinary tract infections on admission or face reimbursement cuts if a catheter-
associated urinary tract infection occurs.  It is unclear what type of diagnostic 
screening will be helpful to establish POA for surgical site infections.  It is also 
unclear when the test itself must be done.  Perhaps hospitals can take samples 
on admission, but only complete the test if needed for billing purposes.  That 
would save the hospital money on diagnostic testing, but would seem contrary to 
the purpose of testing.  
 
The possible addition of MRSA and CDAD as HACs might require testing of 
every patient entering the hospital.  This might be appropriate as an infection 
control measure, especially if it is adopted across an entire germ shed, but here it 
                                                 
34 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47201.  
35 FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47201.  Medicare is now overcoming its initial uncertainty 
regarding CDAD.  The FY 2009 Proposed Rule included CDAD on the HAC candidate 
list. FY 2009 Proposed Rule, at 23558.  
36 The HAC rule does not include any exception for non-negligent care. 
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might be implemented as a reimbursement rule, untethered to best medical 
practice. 
 
3.  Creating new diagnostic codes for MRSA infections 
 
A third question concerns creating diagnostic codes to facilitate adding new 
conditions to the HAC list.  Some HACs were not selected in part due to the 
absence of an appropriate ICD-9-CM code.  In the MedPAC public meeting 
discussing the proposal, MedPAC Research Director Jack Ashby stated: 
 
“Many were surprised that CMS did not include MRSA infections in 
this program, given the attention that these drug-resistant infections 
have received, but MRSA is not a CC or major CC so its presence 
alone would not result in additional payment and that pretty much 
disqualified it from the criteria of this program.  But in addition to 
that, there is some question as to whether this infection can always 
be detected at admission.” (MedPAC, 2007b). 
 
Ventilator Associated Pneumonia (VAP) was also excluded due, in part, to the 
absence of an appropriate ICD-9-CM code.   
 
But this problem is easily corrected.  Medicare controls the creation and 
modification of ICD-9-CM codes.  The ICD-9-CM Coordination and Maintenance 
Committee has been working on a new code for VAP since at least 2004 (ICD, 
2004).  Medicare discussed the need for a new code for VAP at the September 
29, 2006 meeting of the ICD-9-CM Coordination and Maintenance Committee.37  
The new code was adopted a year later (ICD, 2007).  With the new code in 
place, Medicare has now added VAP to the HAC candidate list in the FY 2009 
Proposed Rule, along with five other infectious conditions.38   Many of these 
additions to the HAC candidate list deserve comment, but we will limit our 
attention to MRSA.  
  
E.  MRSA as a “reasonably preventable condition”  
 
In the FY 2009 Proposed Rule, Medicare announced that MRSA (and CDAD) 
were candidates for inclusion in the HAC list.39  CMS is proclaiming that both 
conditions are “reasonably preventable through the application of evidence-
based guidelines.”40  If that is indeed the case, then many physicians and 
hospitals are guilty of rank malpractice today.  The history of these guidelines 
                                                 
37 See FY 2008 Final Rule, at 47209. 
38 FY 2009 Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 23528, 23556 (April 30, 2008). 
39 FY 2009 Proposed Rule, at 23558-60. 
40 Pub. L. 109-171, Section 5001(c) (2005), amending Section 1886(d)(4) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. section 1395ww(d)(4)).  
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suggests that Medicare’s conclusions are overly simplistic and ignores the many 
difficulties in effective implementation, including the lack of reimbursement. 
 
Beginning in 1995, the CDC’s Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory 
Committee published recommendations to hinder the spread of vancomycin-
resistant enterococcus (VRE) (CDC, 1995).  Two years later, they published 
interim guidelines regarding vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(VRSA) (CDC, 2007).  Both are laudable summaries of the published Medline 
literature, but no mention is made of reimbursement.  Recommendations include 
private rooms for VRE infected patients; dedicated devices for VRE areas; 
heightened cleaning, sterilization, and isolation protocols; and extensive lab 
testing of screening samples (CDC, 2005).  As of 2008, the CDC has 13 infection 
control and prevention guidelines for healthcare-associated infections, covering 
1,198 recommendations (GAO, 2008).  It is not clear which of these guidelines 
will eventually become standards for reimbursement, or what hospitals are to do 
when guidelines conflict or when the evidence base changes.  
 
When MRSA is present on admission or discharge, we see germ shed 
externalities at play.  Similarly, for CDAD, “more than one-half of the total burden 
of health care-associated CDAD cases have their onset in long-term care 
facilities” (McDonald, 2007).  So long as Medicare focuses on DRG 
reimbursement in single institutions, germ sheds will not be directly addressed. 
   
 
IV.  Conclusion:  Reducing MRSA Germ Shed Pollution by US Hospitals 
 
If the level of MRSA pollution is too high within a germ shed, then hospitals and 
other institutions should invest in infection control and antibiotic stewardship on a 
regional basis.  One key question that has been identified is reimbursement – 
who will pay?  Medicare has focused on discrete providers and single episodes 
of care.  The current and proposed rules extract financial penalties from hospitals 
for hospital-associated infections, even in the absence of negligence.  Medicare’s 
value-based purchasing plan is a Pigovian tax on hospital-associated infections, 
imposed without regard to causation or pollution in the germ shed.  
 
When Medicare enshrines certain evidence-based guidelines as the gold 
standard, one concern is the federalization of the standard of care, which 
Congress has been historically loath to legislate.41  Federalization suppresses 
the market for improving medical practice, with Medicare as the final arbiter.  
Medicare hasn’t crossed this Rubicon yet, but may do so soon with the continued 
implementation of value-based purchasing.  
 
                                                 
41 Yet there is no question after Gonzales v. Oregon, 6 S.Ct. 904 (2006) that it has the 
authority to do so under the Commerce Clause. 
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As a more modest alternative, Medicare could create DRG codes for hospital 
infection control and antimicrobial stewardship, and set payment rates at a 
sufficient level to control resistance more effectively.  To address germ shed 
externalities, some portion of the conservation DRG reimbursement could be 
placed at risk based on regional achievement of antibiotic resistance goals.  To 
facilitate this process, hospitals could be financially encouraged to undertake 
joint infection control and conservation initiatives within the relevant hospital 
markets.  Activities undertaken under these programs would be exempt from 
fraud and abuse and antitrust laws, permitting private coordination.  Top-down 
national guidelines could then be replaced with the practices that worked best in 
each local community using local surveillance data, with decisions made by the 
relatively small number of hospitals, long-term care facilities and other institutions 
in the market. 
 
The key to effective management of MRSA pollution in a germ shed will be 
greatly improved and rationalized economic incentives for the various 
independent institutions, fostering coordination and cooperation within the germ 
shed.   
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